Abstract-The Internet of Things (IoT) consists of numerous inter-connected resource-constrained devices such as sensors nodes and actuators, which are linked to the Internet. By 2020 it is anticipated that the IoT paradigm will include approximately 20 billion connected devices. The interconnection of such devices provides the ability to collect a huge amount of data for processing and analysis. A significant portion of the transacted data between IoT devices is private information, which must not in any way be eavesdropped on or tampered with. Security in IoT devices is therefore of paramount importance for further development of the technology. Such devices typically have limited area and energy resources, which makes the use of classic cryptography prohibitively expensive. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a class of novel hardware security primitives that promise a paradigm shift in many security applications; their relatively simple architecture can answer many of the security challenges of energy-constrained IoT devices. In this paper, we discuss the design challenges of secure IoT systems; then we explain the principles of PUFs; finally we discuss the outstanding reliability and security problems of PUF technology and outline the open research questions in this field.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a network of physical objects, which are connected to the internet infrastructure to perform tasks without human interaction. These objects are typically embedded with electronics, software and sensors, which enables them to collect and exchange data. The network connectivity allows these devices to be operated and controlled remotely. IoT technology is expected to be used in a wide variety of applications, such as personal health monitoring devices, the smart home, smartphones, environmental monitoring systems, and critical infrastructure (e.g. power grids, transportation systems, and water pipes) [1] .
Although the IoT is expected to have tremendous economic benefits, the security of IoT technology is still a challenging problem, [2] . First of all the vast majority of these devices are expected to communicate wirelessly, and will be connected to the Internet, which makes them especially susceptible to confidentiality threats from attackers snooping for messages contents. Malicious adversaries can easily intercept packets. For unencrypted communication, adversaries can decipher contents simply by listening to broadcast packets, [3] . Second, most IoT devices are expected to be deployed in remote locations with little or no protection; therefore they can be vulnerable to invasive side channel attacks, [4] . Malicious adversaries can potentially gain access to a device and apply well know power or timing analyses to extract sensitive data that might be stored on the IoT node, such as encryption keys, digital identifiers, and recorded measurements. Third, a large proportion of IoT devices operate in an energy-constrained environment with very limited hardware resources. This greatly limits the number of affordable security enhancement solutions, [3] . In particular, classic cryptography algorithms will be prohibitively expensive. A typical IoT device may have only 512 bytes of memory; therefore there may not be sufficient space for storing cipher keys. Further, many encryption algorithms require extra memory space for storing lookup tables in order to satisfy performance requirements. For example, the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) may need 800 bytes for lookup tables. RC5 is another classic encryption algorithm which has been seen as a potential candidate for lowend IoT devices, however recent studies have shown that RC5 algorithm can fail to complete its computations in a typical RFID platform using energy harvesting, because of the lack of enough energy to perform memory write tasks, [5] . Moreover, RC5 includes 32-bit rotations, which can be a challenge to implement on 8-bit or 16-bit devices, and which are datadependent. Therefore, it could be subject to timing attacks. The use of lightweight ciphers has also been proposed for RFID tags, a typical IoT platform. However these algorithms still have many vulnerabilities, most importantly, their small key sizes which makes them inherently insecure, [6] .
The use of physically unclonable functions (PUF) could be an answer to many of the IoT's security requirements at an acceptable cost, [7, 8] . In this paper, we explain how PUF technology can be employed to provide hardware-based solutions for securing IoT nodes. Section 2 outlines the design principles of PUF devices, and summarises their evaluation metrics. Section 3 presents two PUF-based security schemes. Section 4 discusses the outstanding reliability and security problems of this technology. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
II. PRINCIPLES OF PUF DESIGN AND EVALUATION METHODS
A Silicon-based PUF can be regarded as an integrated circuit, capable of providing different outputs for the same set of inputs when implemented on different chips. This property can be exploited to generate a unique signature for each hardware device. PUF circuits are designed to exploit variability in CMOS technologies. This is caused by imperfections in manufacturing processes that lead to intrinsic and random variations in the physical and electrical characteristic of integrated circuits, such as the metal resistivity and the effective channel lengths of transistors. As VLSI circuit technologies are scaled, it is beyond our ability to control specific performance-dependent and power-dependent parameters. At deep sub-micron technology nodes, the achievement of parameter precision becomes exponentially more difficult due to the limitations imposed by quantum mechanics, [9] . Therefore, variability has become an unavoidable characteristic of CMOS technologies, [9] . Although process variation may be an unwanted effect from the circuit designer's viewpoint, it is vital for building PUF circuits. There are many techniques that can be used to build a PUF circuit, all of which are based on the same design principle, which is to exploit the inherent variation of CMOS transistors in order to build a circuit whose output is not only dependent on the inputs values but also on the electrical characteristics of the underlying circuitry. Examples include delay-based structures such as ring oscillators and arbiter PUFs, [10] , as well as current-based structures such as the TCO PUF, [11] . To illustrate the operation principles of a PUF circuit, consider the generic ring oscillators-based PUF given in Figure 1 . This comprises two multiplexers, two counters, one comparator and several ring oscillators (ROs), each of which oscillates at a unique frequency depending on the delay characteristics of its inverters. These vary from device to device due to manufacturing variation. The two multiplexers select two ROs that are compared. The two counter blocks count the number of oscillations of the selected ROs in a fixed time interval. At the end of the interval, the outputs of the two counters are compared. Depending on which of the two counters has the highest value, the output of the PUF is set to 0 or 1, this means the output of this circuit depends on both the input which select the ROs, and on the delays of the inverters which determine the oscillation frequency, and this varies from one chip to another. Thus this PUF can provide a unique digital signature for each hardware device. There are a number of metrics used to evaluate the quality a PUF design, a comprehensive list of these can be found elsewhere, [12] . Here, we are going to present the two most commonly used design metrics, as follows.
A. Uniqueness
Uniqueness is a measure of the ability of a device to generate unique IDs. To estimate this, we use the inter-chip Hamming distance between set of responses generated by the same PUF structure on different devices. This is given as:
where R i and R j are the generated response outputs from the i th and j th devices with the same PUF configuration and l is the number of devices used. Ideally the uniqueness should be 50%, which means each PUF device has a unique response.
B. Reliability
Reliability is of a measure of the ability of the PUF to generate a consistent response R for a challenge C, given variations in the operating environment such as supply voltage and temperature. To estimate this, we use the intra-chip Hamming Distance ( )
where R i,k and R j,k are the k th bits of the i th and j th response outputs of the same device with the same PUF configuration. n is the number of response bits and l the number of devices. Ideally the reliability should be 100%, which mean the PUF response remains the same regardless of noise and variability of the operating conditions.
III. PUF-BASED HARDWARE SECURITY SOLUTIONS
There are generally two classes of security applications for PUFs [7, 13] :
A. PUF-Based Authentication
In order to establish trust in an IoT device, its identity must be verified. Figure 2 illustrates a conceptual PUF-based authentication process. The first stage of the authentication process is Enrolment: in which a Trusted Third Party which has access to the IoT device embedding the PUF, applies a large number of randomly chosen challenges and stores the corresponding responses in a secure database. Then the device can be deployed. The second stage is verification, in which the verification authority which also has access to the pre-recorded CRPs selects a challenge that has never been used, obtains the PUF response from the IoT device, and then checks it against the previously recorded value in its database. Only if the two values match, can the verification authority conclude that the IoT device is authentic. To protect against man-in-the-middle attacks challenges can never be reused. It follows that the verifier must collect a large number of CRPs during the enrolment stage so that they will not run out. 
B. PUF-Based Encryption/Decryption
Privacy and confidentiality is typically achieved through the use of encryption algorithms. One particularly attractive application of PUF devices is encryption key generation, which avoids the need to store keys on the chip. This makes the IoT node less susceptible to invasive side channels attacks.
However, because of noise, the PUF outputs are likely to be slightly different on each evaluation, even on the same IC for the same set of inputs. Therefor it is vital to ensure the consistency of PUF responses in order to obtain a stable encryption key, this can be achieved using error correction codes. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate a conceptual PUF-based symmetric key encryption scheme. At the encryption stage the PUF generates a response (R) based on a pre-specified challenge (C). The response is applied to an error correction decoding scheme along with syndrome bits (S), which should have been pre-computed. This helps to correct any potential noise-related errors in the PUF response and generates a stable key for encryption. Finally the key is XORed with a plaintext to generate a ciphertext. In order to decrypt, the receiver uses pre-computed CRPs and their corresponding syndrome bits to generate the key as shown in Figure 4 . Note that in this scheme, it is assumed that the receiver has access to numerous pre-recoded CRPs of the sender PUF. This scheme is best operated in a slave/master mode in which the resourceconstrained IoT device acts as a slave sender and a resource rich base station acts as a master receiver. The communication in this case should be initiated by the receiver. The latter transmits a challenge (C) and corresponding syndrome bits (S). These are used by the sender to compute the key and encrypt its transmitted data. Although an eavesdropper on the channel can obtain the challenges (C), he still needs to have access to the PUF device to extract the key. Such risk can be mitigated by periodically changing the key. PUF devices still have a number of outstanding reliability and security problems which need to be addressed before they can be adopted. One of the major reliability problems is caused by the ageing of CMOS transistors. This refers to the gradual degradation of integrated circuits which can cause permanent changes in the electrical parameters of the CMOS devices (e.g. the threshold voltage) [14] . Such phenomena may have adverse effects on the reliability of the PUF, as is evident from our experimental results, shown in Figure 5 , in which the reliability metrics of several PUF designs are estimated at different points in time and normalized to the reliability value of the fresh circuits. Fluctuations in the operating conditions such as temperature can also introduce errors in the PUF responses and degrade the reliability as can be seen from our results in Figure  6 . This effectively means the PUF may generate different responses under different operating conditions and/or time intervals even if the challenge remains the same. This in turn may cause a denial of service to an IoT device relying on the PUF's outputs to generate a valid chip identifier for authentication purposes. Furthermore, if the degradation in reliability is significantly large, it may cause more errors than can be corrected by the ECC block in figure 3 . Then the PUF cannot be relied upon for stable encryption key generation.
Security challenges to PUF technology are mainly due to their susceptibility to modelling attacks. In principle, if an adversary manages somehow to collect a subset of all CRPs of the PUF, he can derive a numerical model capable of imitating/predicting the PUF responses to arbitrary challenges with high probability. This allows such an adversary to use his model to gain an unauthorized access to an IoT network. There are a number of techniques with proven capability in building numerical models of PUF devices, most notably machine learning (ML), linear programming or algebraic methods [15, 16] . Furthermore, the vast majority of IoT nodes may be deployed in remote environments with little or no protection; therefore gaining access to these devices for CRP collection can be relatively easy. Therefore, unless appropriately addressed, the vulnerability of PUFs to modelling attacks may prove to be fatal to their usability for IoT security applications. Securing devices is of paramount importance for the safe deployment of IoT technology, however, the vast majority of these devices are expected to be low energy and lightweight, which makes the use of classic cryptographic algorithm prohibitively expensive. Physically unclonable functions (PUF) are a new class of security primitive; they normally have a relatively simple structure, which makes them ideal candidates for affordable security solutions for IoT networks. This work demonstrates how PUF can be used to build low cost authentications and encryption schemes. However, PUF technology still suffers from a number of reliability and security problems. Resolving the shortcomings in a manner that takes into consideration the stringent energy and resources constraints of IoT devices is a hot area for research. Ultimately, the IoT future will rely on our ability to find cost-efficient, dependable security solutions; otherwise a large portion of IoT nodes will be connected to the internet, with little or no protection, which may lead to a wide range of unprecedented security attacks.
